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On Global Patent Cooperation 
3 
The Hon. Pauline Newman* 
 
I commend Fordham Law School for this excellent program 
and for the distinguished group of participants who are here.  This 
international conference recognizes that industrial and intellectual 
property issues do not stop with national borders.  I want to ex-
plore with this influential audience just how far it may be possible 
to reach across these borders. 
The program today deals with comparisons of the laws of pat-
ent grant and patent enforcement.  With the mature national patent 
systems that have been achieved among the nations here repre-
sented, it is time to move beyond the issues of patentability in the 
national patent offices.  A reasonably harmonized system of na-
tional patents is not much use unless there also is a reasonably con-
sistent and economically available system of judicial interpretation 
and enforcement. 
The interpretation of national and regional patents and the 
availability of infringement remedies in the world market are of vi-
tal importance to international business.  Increased international 
enforcement actions appear inevitable—at least among the major 
industrial nations here represented.  The practical knowledge of 
what is enforceable in other countries sometimes is gleaned with 
surprise.  The surprise of American patentees seeking to enforce 
their patents overseas is, however, far outweighed by the shock of 
foreign patentees who confront our legal system for the first time.  
So as we work toward conforming the international patent granting 
practices, I encourage you to think creatively about new ap-
proaches to international litigation: both in the interpretation of 
patent rights and in enforcement practices. 
 
* Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.  A version 
of this Address was delivered on April 3, 1997, at the Fifth Annual Conference on Inter-
national Intellectual Property Law and Policy at Fordham University School of Law.  
Footnotes were supplied by the Fordham Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment 
Law Journal. 
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The patent laws of the industrialized nations have much in 
common—as they should, if there is truth in the fundamental eco-
nomics of the system of patents.  Yet when disputes arise, they of-
ten take us into the gray areas where there is inadequate precedent 
or where small differences in the facts can affect the result.  We 
see this particularly today in the many aspects of computers and 
software, and in biotechnology, with its social and ethical as well 
as legal complexities.  It is usually at the nuanced edges that dif-
ferences in national law and social policy can affect the judicial 
viewpoint.  As a result, there can be different enforcement oppor-
tunities and different outcomes in different countries.  In such a 
case all our efforts at harmonization of the laws of patentability are 
overshadowed by the realities of decision-making power. 
The similarities in the economic philosophy underlying all pat-
ent systems have produced quite similar bodies of national law.  
This community of interests has enabled the various international 
treaties that have smoothed many of the edges, to mutual benefit.  
But it’s the differences that must be comprehended by international 
business, as the program today recognizes.  So it is important for 
the patent user community not only to know the law, but to under-
stand the policy principles that can affect the judicial outcome.  As 
you well know, it is not just what judges decide that affects com-
mercial relationships, but what you think they might decide if 
given the chance. 
The fruitful collaboration that the various patent offices have 
achieved in recent years opens the door for the first time to the 
possibility of uniformity in judicial decisions, whether through ju-
dicial collaboration or, more effectively—and this is my theme for 
today—through an international court convened for that purpose.  I 
sometimes wonder if we have been lulled into thinking that there 
will result uniformly viewed and enforced patents in all countries 
if only we make a few minor changes in a few national laws, as re-
flected in today’s harmonization debates. 
Industry and governments recognize the technology depend-
ence of the world economy.  They understand the critical national 
interests in trade policy, and they understand that the products of 
intellectual property have become dominant factors in trade. They 
also understand that the interdependence among trading nations is 
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a powerful factor in world peace and the well-being of peoples. 
We see these complex interests balanced in the GATT1 and the 
TRIPs2 and the NAFTA3 treaties, in the new proposals of WIPO,4 
in the judicial outreaches that are being made by WIPO and among 
nations, and in the international leadership of so many of you here 
today.  We see it in the changes that the new East European repub-
lics have made in their commercial laws and judicial systems dur-
ing their rapid conversion to capitalism.5  In addition, the judges 
who decide patent cases have been meeting together for some 
years—two years ago in the United States and last year in Stock-
holm. 
Your program for these two days is probing some very impor-
tant issues.  I encourage you to go boldly and creatively, as you 
consider the comparative law not just of patenting, but of enforce-
ment.  As you discuss the implications of the Netherlands initiative 
and the other steps taken within the European Union, please also 
look to a wider future.  There is no body of commercial law more 
international in impact, more heavily and constantly negotiated 
through international treaties and accommodated in international 
trade, or more blessed with a cohesive and talented international 
community of practitioners—as is here in this room—having its 
very own United Nations agency, and being in the forefront of 
trade relations at the highest levels of government. 
But unless we have reasonable unanimity of national views of 
how patents are interpreted and enforced, the efforts toward har-
monization of how patents are examined and granted can yield 
 
1. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 
U.N.T.S. 187. 
2. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 33 
I.L.M. 1197 (1994). 
3. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32 
I.L.M. 289 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1994). 
4. Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization, July 14, 
1967, 21 U.S.T. 1770, 828 U.N.T.S. 3. 
5. See Silke von Lewinski, Copyright in Central and Eastern Europe:  An Intellec-
tual Property Metamorphosis, 8 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 39 (1997) 
(paper presented on April 3, 1997, at the Fifth Annual Conference on International Intel-
lectual Property Law and Policy at Fordham University School of Law) (surveying de-
velopments in Eastern and Central European intellectual property law). 
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only an impractical delusion.  We need to understand much more 
about the comparative law and judicial policies, and the relation-
ships between the patent offices and the courts.  We need to com-
prehend all of the factors and traditions: political, cultural, techno-
logical, and economic. 
Despite all of these factors and their complexities, on review of 
specific cases that have been litigated in countries in addition to 
the United States, it seems to me that the differences in result and 
in analysis are no greater than the differences among the judges of 
the Federal Circuit.  As the differences among our judges are being 
smoothed out—it is not always painless—it should be possible to 
smooth out most of the differences among nations. 
From the viewpoint of technology policy or economic policy 
the differences are rarely dramatic.  At present there are a few ma-
jor policy differences centered on the products of genetic manipu-
lation and the patentability of naturally occurring products; such 
differences would test the wisdom of my proposed world court.  
However, the major areas of patent litigation raise primarily eco-
nomic, not social, issues. 
National sovereignty is a powerful factor when suggesting an 
international tribunal.  However, I propose a tribunal where na-
tions do not yield their sovereignty; only citizens wishing to deal 
in the world marketplace with the benefit of multiple national pat-
ents would yield to a tribunal of judges from various nations.  An 
incentive to do so might be provided by reduced filing or mainte-
nance fees, for example, or by other incentives that might be cho-
sen before disputes arise.  The judges, in turn, would be selected at 
random from a cadre of decisionmakers experienced in intellectual 
property law and technology-based litigation.  I recognize the dif-
ficulties in designing a satisfactory tribunal, but I suggest that the 
economic benefits would be sufficient to overcome the organiza-
tional obstacles. 
The most serious obstacle is that there would have to be confi-
dence that it is the law that is being enforced—and wisely and 
justly enforced—and not any particular national interest.  Here, the 
communality of commercial law among commercial nations will 
come to the fore.  Whether a nation’s legal institutions are founded 
in the common law or the civil law tradition, an industrial econ-
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omy is premised on effective laws of property and commerce.  Al-
though we are concerned here only with the laws of intellectual 
property, those laws are based on broad and generally uniform 
principles throughout the community of industrial nations. 
The rules of commerce embody rules of law that are quite uni-
form among nations.  I stress the rule of law.  The term “rule of 
law” often is used in its broad sense of embodying the principles of 
representative government, implemented by legal systems and ju-
dicial institutions.  The legal and judicial institutions that relate to 
patent-based innovation and other aspects of intellectual property 
are not different from those that serve the other purposes of a na-
tion.  The principles of the rule of law are essential to a competi-
tive industrial economy.  I see no insurmountable obstacles to the 
long-term goal of a universally applicable patent law, founded on 
basic economic principles, that transcends national barriers.  With 
continuing coordination of patent examination and enforcement 
practices we may be able to achieve such a patent law, for nations 
are close to this goal in the copyright and trademark fields. 
Those laws are not stagnant, and the ambitious steps toward 
world harmony are mirrored in advances in the concepts of dispute 
resolution.  For example, some East European nations have taken 
the opportunity of conversion to capitalism to adopt innovative ap-
proaches, not only to the commercial aspects of economic growth, 
but also to the institutional and legal framework of an industrial 
economy.  Thus we see, for example, a thriving commercial court 
in Russia.  The idea of the commercial court is a matter of current 
controversy in the United States, where specialized commercial 
courts have recently been created in a few states—suggesting dis-
satisfaction with the powerful tradition of generalist courts in this 
nation.  It was in this tradition that the Federal Circuit was set up 
as a generalist court, having many areas of jurisdiction in addition 
to patent cases. 
It is interesting to think about whether consistent, just, and cor-
rect decisions of patent disputes are best obtained from generalist 
or specialized courts.  I am not sure that we have yet answered that 
question.  Several nations are considering whether to form courts 
to handle intellectual property disputes, and judges of many coun-
tries have discussed it with us.  This is an ongoing question: one 
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whose answer could be coordinated with the concept of a special 
tribunal of international judges to handle intellectual property dis-
putes. 
The economic impact of legal systems and their judicial im-
plementation is profound, although we seldom focus on it.  Eco-
nomics underlay the formation of the Federal Circuit: the percep-
tion that an inadequate legal system was doing economic harm to 
technology-based industry.  The primary purpose of the formation 
of the Federal Circuit was to gain nationwide consistency by 
eliminating the divergence in the laws and judicial approaches of 
the regional circuit courts.  By definition, a single court would 
have less divergence of views than would the twelve existing cir-
cuit courts.  That is the least that would be achieved by a suprana-
tional court for patent cases. 
Intellectual property law boasts a history of international coop-
eration that is unique in its development.  When the call arose 
many years ago for international coordination and simplification in 
the cost and complexity of creating an international patent estate, it 
was perhaps premature to hope that coordinated patent filing 
would eventually lead to coordinated patent enforcement.  The 
Patent Cooperation Treaty,6 the first attempt at reducing the cost of 
the patent application process, did not deal with patent enforce-
ment or even with patent harmonization.  But it was part of the 
long-term vision of the originators of that concept, and I suggest 
that it is time to consider whether the possibility can bear fruit. 
The nation-by-nation litigation that we now see, and that ap-
pears to be increasing, is reminiscent of the circuit-by-circuit liti-
gation that existed before the Federal Circuit was formed.  I draw 
on our experience, in suggesting that greater international certainty 
may be achieved in investment and trade decisions, in the interest 
of all nations, were there an effective and affordable mode of in-
ternational dispute resolution. 
Legal systems constitute a form of national policy, and an in-
ternational legal system, even in the narrow realm of intellectual 
property law, would implicate fundamental national policies.  To 
 
6. Patent Cooperation Treaty, Washington, D.C., June 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T. 7645, 
1160 U.N.T.S. 231 (entered into force Jan. 24, 1978). 
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be effective in supporting commercial activity, laws require a high 
degree of certainty in their application.  When industrial activity 
depends on world markets, the degree of certainty available from 
the laws governing these markets is an omnipresent concern.  
There must be confidence in what the law means, that it will be 
administered expeditiously and justly, and eventually that it will be 
administered the same way in different forums.  Inadequacies in 
any of these aspects have economic consequences.  As more and 
more industry of all nations moves into the international market-
place, the economic consequences of international patent disputes 
will become more pervasive. 
The purpose of judicial institutions is the efficient and effective 
application of law.  Ideally, a commercial law would be suffi-
ciently comprehensive that its application raises no uncertainty.  
We have not reached that stage of confidence in the patent law.  
There are too many nuances and permutations, as new technolo-
gies and new issues arise.  However, the areas in which these un-
certainties arise are—it seems to me—matters not of national pol-
icy, but of technologic understanding.  Is it reasonable to require 
that such issues be relitigated in multiple nations, under multiple 
legal and judicial philosophies?  There are cogent arguments on 
both sides of that question; my purpose today is to raise the ques-
tion. 
The law and its administration must keep pace with the needs 
of technology and industry.  We find ourselves in times of dynamic 
technologic change; let us stay alert to fresh possibilities.  I leave 
these issues in your hands. 
I envy you who are immersed in this action: with so many in-
teresting prospects.  There will be much work for legal and eco-
nomic and political scholars. 
